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Abstract 
Many Western economies have reformed their welfare systems with the aim of activating 
welfare recipients by increasing welfare-to-work programmes and job search enforcement. 
We evaluate the three most important German welfare-to-work programmes implemented 
after a major reform in January 2005 ("Hartz IV"). Our analysis is based on a unique 
combination of large scale survey and administrative data that is unusually rich with respect 
to individual, household, agency level, and regional information. We use this richness to 
allow for a selection-on-observables approach when doing the econometric evaluation. We 
find that short-term training programmes on average increase their participants' employment 
perspectives and that all programmes induce further programme participation. We also 
show that there is considerable effect heterogeneity across different subgroups of 
participants that could be exploited to improve the allocation of welfare recipients to the 
specific programmes and thus increase overall programme effectiveness.  
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Over the last decade many OECD countries faced increasing numbers of welfare recipients. In 
Germany, for example, the number of recipients of welfare payments had risen to about 4.5 
million people by the end of 2004. Many countries reacted by conducting welfare reforms that 
resulted in a shift of labour market policies from passive benefit receipt towards increased job 
search and work requirements among welfare recipients. Post-reform programmes typically 
focus on activation of welfare recipients to encourage employment and to reduce welfare 
receipt and incentives to stay welfare-dependent. Needy but employable welfare recipients are 
obliged to participate in activation programmes, and they can be sanctioned by benefit cuts 
when not complying.  
Welfare research has traditionally focused on the USA, see for instance Grogger (2003), who 
investigates the effect of time limits for benefits and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on 
welfare receipt and work. Welfare-to-work efforts were considerably increased across US 
states over the 1990s. In the course of the reforms, an extensive literature evaluating the 
various welfare programmes has evolved, see Blank (2002) and Moffitt (2002) for a review of 
the US welfare reforms and of the related empirical literature.  
In Europe, where unemployment insurance (UI) is usually more generous and where there are 
larger numbers of UI claimants than in the US, the literature has almost exclusively focused 
on the evaluation of programmes targeted at UI rather than welfare recipients (see e.g. the 
surveys by Martin and Grubb, 2001; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002; Kluve, 2006; Wunsch, 2006). 
However, the results are not easily extendable to welfare recipients because they differ 
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Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  1 considerably from regular UI recipients with respect to their labour market relevant 
characteristics and employment perspectives.
1 These differences may be particularly relevant 
as the programmes have been found to exhibit considerable effect heterogeneity with respect 
to participant characteristics (for Germany see for instance Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen, 
2005, Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch, 2006, 2007, and Wunsch and Lechner, 2008). Recently, 
European countries conducted welfare reforms that also increase work incentives and job 
search enforcement for welfare recipients and that introduce substantial welfare-to-work 
programmes, thus raising considerable interest in the effects of these costly measures.
2 One of 
the most substantial welfare reforms, the German so-called Hartz IV reform, has taken place 
in the beginning of 2005. 
In this paper we use regression adjusted caliper propensity score matching on unique data that 
combines exceptionally rich survey, administrative and regional data to evaluate the three 
most important welfare-to-work programmes used in Germany since the Hartz IV reform. The 
programmes considered comprise (i) very short training programmes that include basic job 
search assistance, work tests and minor adjustment of skills, (ii) further training that aims at 
improving job-related skills, and (iii) so-called 1-Euro-jobs, which are effectively similar to a 
work requirement with some small extra remuneration (workfare).
3 The programmes started 
between October 2006 and March 2007, so that we naturally must focus on short-run 
outcomes 6 to 12 months after programme start. 
                                                           
1   Eligibility for either welfare benefit receipt or UI hinges on an individual's unemployment history. Thus, 
welfare recipients and unemployed are by definition distinct with respect to characteristics relevant for labour 
market success.  
2    Surveys on welfare reforms in European countries are provided by Torfing (1999), Kildal (2001), and 
Halvorsen and Jensen (2004) for the Nordic countries, Finn (2000) and Beaudry (2002) and Dostal (2008) for 
the UK, Finn (2000) and Knijn (2001) for the Netherlands, and Wunsch (2008), Jacobi and Kluve (2007) and 
Konle-Seidl et al. (2007) for Germany.  
3   The following recent papers look at other policies targeted specifically at German welfare recipients: 
Bernhard et al. (2008) study wage subsidies, Wolff and Nivorozhkin (2008) investigate start-up programmes 
and Schneider (2008) analyses benefit sanctions.  
Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  2 We find no significant effects of the programmes on the likelihood of future welfare receipt 
and that programme participation induces further subsequent programme participation. With 
respect to the employment effects of the programmes, we find positive and significant effects 
for some programmes and groups of participants, in particular for short training and for 
welfare recipients without a migration background. Our results are in line with Wolff and 
Jozwiak (2007) who investigate the effect of participation of welfare recipients in short-term 
training, as well as with Hohmeyer and Wolff (2007) who evaluate the effectiveness of 1-
Euro-jobs. Both studies use propensity score matching. However, they solely rely on 
administrative data and focus on programmes that started at the beginning of 2005, i.e. 
directly after the reform. This period was characterised by strong implementation and data 
collection problems, which may have affected their results. By considering more recent 
programmes, our findings cannot be attributed to those temporary phenomena of the 
introductory phase of the new regime. We also provide more robust evidence because we use 
much more informative data than the earlier studies. 
Moreover, we add to the literature in further dimensions: (i) We also evaluate more 
substantial further training that provides job-related skills. (ii) We investigate effect 
heterogeneity in a detailed way and investigate a variety of outcome variables, thus providing 
considerably more comprehensive results than earlier studies. (iii) We assess the optimality of 
the allocation process of welfare recipients to the different programmes and find considerable 
scope for improvement with respect to both taking up employment and leaving welfare. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background on the 
economic conditions and relevant institutions in Germany since 2005. In Section 3, we 
introduce the data and our evaluation sample followed by a discussion of the definition of 
programmes and participation. Section 4 displays descriptive statistics for the evaluation 
sample. Identification and estimation of the effects of interest as well as the simulation of 
Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  3 alternative allocations into treatments are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we present the 
effect estimates and simulation results. Section 7 concludes. 
2  Economic conditions and institutions in Germany since 2005 
2.1  German unemployment insurance and welfare  
Recent reforms of German welfare and labour market policies focused on the activation of 
welfare recipients based on improved employment services to enhance individual 
employment prospects ('Fördern') and on making greater demands on individuals to actively 
participate in and speed up the reintegration process ('Fordern'). The so-called Hartz reforms
4 
were gradually implemented in the beginning of 2003 (Hartz I and II), 2004 (Hartz III), and 
2005 (Hartz IV).
5 Jacobi and Kluve (2007) provide an excellent survey of the reform package.  
Before 2005, unemployed with no or expired unemployment benefit entitlements (henceforth 
UB) were either eligible for unemployment assistance (UA), which was conditional on 
previous employment, or for social assistance (SA), or a combination of both (if UA was 'too 
low'). Both UA and SA were means-tested. When Hartz IV and the Social Code II came into 
force in 2005, unemployment benefit II (UBII) replaced both UA and SA. In contrast to UA, 
which replaced up to 57% of the previous net earnings, UBII, like the former SA, does not 
depend on former earnings. Furthermore, it is means-tested and the test is based on the wealth 
and income of all individuals in the household.  
At the beginning of 2005, the standard UBII amounted to 345 EUR in West Germany and 331 
EUR in East Germany. Meanwhile, the level of UBII in East Germany was adjusted to the 
western level and UBII was slightly increased in both parts to compensate for inflation (351 
                                                           
4   The reforms were named after the chairperson of the commission proposing the reforms, Peter Hartz, who 
was a Human Resources executive and a member of the board of executives of the German car producer VW 
until July 2005. Ironically, Hartz was convicted of embezzlement in January 2007. 
5   Hartz I-III focused on labour market institutions and unemployment benefit recipients, whereas Hartz IV is 
targeted at welfare recipients. 
Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  4 EUR in January 2009). Besides the standard UBII, welfare payments also include compulsory 
social insurance contributions, rents and housing costs. Further costs for special needs might 
be covered as well. According to Ochel (2005), standard UBII is less generous than former 
UA (on average EUR 550 in 2003 in West Germany).  
UBII access is conditional on claimants being 'employable', i.e. on being capable of working 
for at least 15 hours per week. Employable claimants have to register with the local 
employment office. One important innovation is that welfare recipients are obliged to 
participate in welfare-to-work programmes. The job seekers' rights and duties in the activation 
process are usually set out in writing in a so-called integration contract. This binding 
agreement between the employment office and the welfare recipient contains obligations 
concerning programme participation and job search activities as well as services provided by 
the employment office. Non-compliance and/or the rejection of 'acceptable'
6 job offers can be 
sanctioned by temporary benefit cuts.
7 
The administration of activation programmes and welfare receipt is in most cases executed by 
local agencies that are formed as joint ventures between the local employment office of the 
public employment service (PES) and the local community. However, in 69 out of 429 offices 
the agencies are run by the local community alone, entirely outside of the responsibility and 
competency of the PES.
8  
The Hartz IV reform constitutes a remarkable change in German welfare policy. For the first 
time welfare recipients are a target group of labour market activation. Before 2005, almost no 
effort was made to reintegrate those persons into the labour market. Thus, there is neither 
                                                           
6   According to the legislation, almost any job is acceptable, even if it does not correspond to the individual's 
former profession or education. 
7   Though job seekers might be threatened with temporary benefit cuts, Jacobi and Kluve (2007) argue that they 
are rarely enforced in practice, since they frequently entailed costly lawsuits with benefit claimants.  
8   In this study, we only consider the regular joint ventures. 
Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  5 experience nor any evidence on the effectiveness and efficiency of welfare-to-work 
programmes prior to the reform.    
2.2   Economic conditions in Germany  
The Hartz-IV reform came into effect in a period of mild recovery of the German economy. 
After stagnation and a decline in GDP in 2002 and 2003, GDP grew moderately in 2004 
(1.1%) and 2005 (0.8%). In 2006, GDP growth was up to 2.9% while 2007 saw a moderate 
slow down (2.5%).
9 The number of persons receiving welfare amounted to roughly 4.5 
million in January 2005. It increased steadily during 2005 – partly due to the adjustment to 
the new welfare system – and reached a peak of 5.5 million in April 2006. Since then it has 
declined to just fewer than 5 million in August 2008. In January 2005 there were 2.3 million 
unemployed persons receiving welfare. This number increased during the following months to 
peak at roughly 3 million at the beginning of 2006. Since then unemployment among welfare 
recipients declined to 2.2 million in August 2008.
10  
2.3  German welfare-to-work programmes since 2005  
This section gives a brief overview over the most important activation programmes targeted at 
welfare recipients. The post 2005 programmes are more in favour of a 'work first' approach, 
i.e. their primary goal is to integrate benefit claimants into the labour market quickly. Table 1 
displays entries into the most important activation programmes for the period 2005-2007 
along with the corresponding annual expenditures in millions of EURO. The so-called 1-
Euro-jobs are by far most frequently assigned, followed by short trainings and further 
training. Expenditures on short trainings are comparably low due to their short duration. Other 
important categories are job placement by third parties, wage subsidies, and start up grants. 
Let us now discuss the different programmes in more detail. 
                                                           
9   Figures according to the Federal Statistical Office; see www.destatis.de.  
10   Figures according to the Federal Employment Agency; see www.arbeitsagentur.de.  
Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  6 Table 1: Entries in and expenditures for selected activation programmes*  
Category     Entries     Expenditures in million €
   2005  2006**  2007**  2005  2006  2007 
Short training  410,884  480,675 545,960  157.5  164.1  163.3 
Further training  69,906  124,169 167,200  196.3  377.6  503.7 
1-Euro-jobs/other public employment progr.  633,938 815,380 798,774 1104.5  1381.2  1321.5
Job placement services by third parties   272,627  153,381  119,390 62.9 63.7 47.5 
Wage subsidies   60,675  111,372 135,806  145.7  316.7  408.2 
Start up grants  20,097  48,751 52,718  21.9  63.7 71 
Others 291,475  536,408 666,319  1435.9 1473.8 1706.2
Total 1,707,410 2,270,136 2,486,167 3124.7 3840.8 4221.4
* If not stated differently, figures are for joint ventures alone.  
** Includes both joint ventures and community controlled agencies.  
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency at http://www.pub.arbeitsamt.de/hst/services/statistik/detail/e.html. 
Short training courses are comparably cheap programmes with durations of usually a few 
days to two weeks, but in any case not more than 12 weeks. They are rather heterogeneous 
with respect to their content and target group and pursue two main objectives. Firstly, they are 
used to check the welfare recipients' occupational aptitude and availability for the job market, 
as well as to provide basic job search assistance. Typical examples are job application and job 
interview trainings. Secondly, the focus of short training is on minor adjustments of job 
relevant skills. This includes language courses, computer classes, and occupation specific 
trainings. Quantitatively, short training is rather important as a programme type, as in 2007, 
roughly 546,000 welfare recipients received some form of short training. 
Further training comprises a more substantial human capital investment and focuses on the 
adaption of the professional skills and qualifications of participants to recent labour market 
requirements, e.g. to mitigate mismatches in times of structural change. The programmes 
typically aim at adjusting skills in the profession held, the completion of an additional 
qualification, receiving a first professional degree, retraining, and the participation in practice 
firms simulating a job in a specific field of profession. Their planned duration reaches from a 
few months to up to three years. 
Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  7 The so-called 1-Euro-jobs  are public-sector-related workfare programmes that were 
introduced in 2005. In contrast to short and further trainings, which are also open to 
unemployed not receiving welfare, 1-Euro-jobs exclusively apply to the activation of welfare 
recipients. According to the legislator, these programmes should be of public interest and 
'additional' in the sense that the work assigned as 1-Euro-jobs would otherwise not be 
accomplished by existing public and private sector companies.
11 Exiting to regular 
employment, if possible, has clear priority over carrying out 1-Euro-jobs. The work load 
typically consists of 20-30 hours per week over a period of 3-9 months. Legally, 1-Euro-jobs 
do not constitute any form of employment. Thus, participants do not receive a (subsidized) 
wage, but merely a 'compensation for job related extra costs' that is paid additionally to 
standard benefits. The name of the programme originates from this compensation being set to 
1 EUR per hour in many cases. Since their introduction in 2005, 1-Euro-jobs have largely 
substituted other forms of public employment programmes. In 2007, almost 800,000 
individuals were assigned to 1-Euro-jobs (or other employment programmes). Expenditures 
amounted to more than 1.3 billion Euros representing more than 30 % of total spending for 
activation programmes.  
In order to introduce more competition with respect to the placement of welfare recipients, the 
Hartz reforms opened the market to job placement services of private companies ('third 
parties') who compete with public institutions. The market is, however, only quasi-liberal, as 
services are bought through vouchers or by means of public biddings organized by the local 
agencies, instead of direct intervention by welfare recipients (see Bernhard et al., 2008). Third 
parties might either be partly or exclusively involved in the job placement activities. The 
remuneration of private providers by the agency is partly dependent on the placement success. 
                                                           
11   Critics who doubt the usefulness of workfare programmes therefore argue that they merely create 'symbolic', 
non-productive employment without providing marketable skills to the participants, see for instance Dostal 
(2008). 
Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  8 Job placement by third parties has been decreasing in numbers, but amounted still to almost 
120,000 in 2007. 
Wage subsidies are paid to firms which employ individuals facing competitive disadvantages 
on the job market during the first months of employment. They should generate an incentive 
to hire such individuals by compensating employers for initial productivity gaps. Roughly 
136,000 jobs for welfare recipients were subsidised in 2007.   
Similarly, start up grants are bridging allowances for taking up self-employment. They are 
either granted to young firms hiring welfare recipients in the form of wage subsidies or 
directly to benefit claimants as promotion of self-employment and private start ups. More than 
20,000 welfare recipients benefitted from start up grants in 2007.   
3  Data and definition of sample and participation status 
3.1   Data  
Our analysis is based on a unique and exceptionally informative data set that combines 
various data sources characterizing welfare recipients. The core of these data is a survey of 
welfare recipients who have been interviewed in two waves at the beginning (January - April 
2007) and around the end of 2007 (November 2007 - March 2008). The survey consists of 
about 25,000 realised interviews in each wave including both a stock sample (roughly 21,000) 
of welfare recipients in October 2006 and a small inflow sample (roughly 4,000) from August 
to December 2006. Despite 93% of interviewees agreeing in the first wave to participate in 
the follow-up interview, attrition was non-negligible, mainly due to 'relocation problems' and 
'refusal to participate'. To make up for these losses, the second wave contains a refreshment 
sample (7,086) that was drawn from the same population as the panel sample (13,914). The 
new participants of the refreshment sample had to answer retrospective questions to make up 
for the information collected from the panel cases in the first wave.  
Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  9 It is important to note that our sample is not drawn randomly from the population of welfare 
recipients, but is instead stratified.
12 Stratification is based on the following individual 
characteristics: age (15-24 / 25-49 / 50-64), children under 3 in the household, and being a 
lone parent. This is done to ensure that the number of observations is sufficiently high for 
these groups, each of which resembles one target group of welfare-to-work programmes. The 
data contain sample weights, denoted by  j η  in the following, for each individual j in the 
sample that take into account both stratification and attrition. 
One problem with the survey data is that information is not symmetric in the panel and 
refreshment sample, because the retrospective questions for the latter do not fully match the 
questions of the first wave. In particular, there is an information asymmetry concerning 
programme starts in the two subsamples.  
Despite this problem, the survey is unique with respect to the information available for 
German welfare recipients and household characteristics as well as sample sizes. The survey 
includes individual characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, education, nationality 
and migration background. It also contains details concerning labour market status, welfare 
receipt, participation in activation programmes, past performance on the labour market and 
job search behaviour. Finally, it includes information on the household such as the number, 
age and employment status of other household members as well as the interviewees' relation 
to them. 
These survey data have been merged with administrative data on welfare recipients provided 
by Germany's Federal Employment Agency (FEA) for the period 1998-2007. They combine 
spell information from social insurance records, programme participation records and the 
benefit payment and jobseeker registers of the PES. The database comprises very detailed 
                                                           
12 In addition, our sample is restricted to a subgroup of agencies. However, the sampled agencies and the 
composition of welfare recipients within this subgroup is very similar to all other agencies in Germany.   
Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  10 information in several dimensions. Personal characteristics include education, age, gender, 
marital status, number of children, profession, nationality, disabilities and health. The benefit 
payment register provides information on type and amount of benefits received as well as 
remaining benefit claims. The jobseeker register includes additional information on the 
desired form of employment and compliance with benefit rules. Moreover, the data comprise 
information on previous employments including the form of employment, industry, 
occupational status and wages. With respect to programme participation, the data covers the 
type of the programme as well as its actual duration, and the planned duration (for training 
only).  
The combined administrative and survey data were linked to further data at the agency and 
regional level. They include a wide range of regional information reflecting labour market 
conditions (e.g. share of unemployed and long term unemployed, share of the elderly among 
unemployed, share of welfare recipients, GDP per worker, share of migrants, population 
density, industry structure) and variables that characterize the agencies' organisational 
structure (e.g. generalised or specialised case management, number and qualification of 
caseworkers, welfare recipients per caseworker, placement strategies, counselling concept).   
3.2   Sample and treatment definition 
The inflow sample of about 4,000 individuals is too small for this application. We therefore 
evaluate programme effects for the stock sample, which is drawn from the population 
receiving welfare in October 2006 (sampling date). Note however, that this sample is 
endogenous with respect to previous programme participation, as it contains in particular 
those persons who did not succeed in exiting welfare receipt, whereas successful exits are not 
observed in the sample. Therefore, treatment effects prior to October 2006 cannot be 
identified. The sample is, however, exogenous with respect to programme participation after 
the sampling date conditional on prior programme participation, benefit receipt, employment, 
Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  11 and further characteristics. We therefore confine our analysis to the effects of programme 
participation after October 2006.  
To obtain sufficiently large samples, we use both the panel and the refreshment samples. 
However, information asymmetries related to differences in the survey design of the two 
samples imply that start dates coming from the survey data can only be consistently identified 
for all individuals from January 2007 onwards. For November and December 2006, only the 
start dates in the administrative records are considered. As survey data are only available up 
to the second interview, which took place between November 2007 and February 2008, and 
administrative records end in December 2007, our evaluation window is rather short. Thus, 
we restrict attention to the first programme (after the first sampling period) that starts before 
April 2007 in order to have a follow-up period for measuring the outcomes which is not too 
short.  
To obtain sufficiently large samples the programmes are aggregated to broader treatment 
categories, see Table 2. Nonparticipants are defined as those individuals not receiving any 
treatment between November 2006 and March 2007. Among the treated categories, the 
programme groups 1-Euro-jobs, short trainings, and further training with a planned duration 
of up to 3 months have sufficient numbers of observations to estimate programme effects 
semiparametrically.
 13 These are also the most important programmes in terms of participants 
and/or expenditures (cf. Table 1). Hence, in the following we focus on these three 
programmes only.
14   
                                                           
13  Further training activities with a planned duration longer than 3 months are not considered as the follow-up 
period would be too short. Note, however, that 1-Euro-jobs also might have longer durations than 3 months. 
But for them we only observe actual duration which is potentially endogenous, so that we do not want to 
group based on the realized durations. 
14 Note that short and further training are also used for UI recipients. Evidence for UI recipients suggests that 
there are initial lock-in effects and at most minor positive longer-run employment effects of these 
programmes (see e.g. Wunsch and Lechner, 2008). 1-Euro-jobs are exclusively targeted at welfare recipients. 
Therefore, no pre-reform evidence for welfare recipients exists.   
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Category  Description of the programmes  Sample sizes
Nonparticipants (NP)  No treatment from November 2006 to March 2007  8,091 
Job placement by third parties   Job placement services by third parties   154 
Job creation schemes  Job creation schemes  72 
'integration grants'  Subsidized employment                                                           103 
Promotion of self-employment  Promotion of self-employment  68 
1-Euro-jobs (OE)  Public workfare programmes   656 
Short training (ST)  Check of the occupational aptitude and availability, job 
application training, job training, job trial, internship 
479 
Further training up to a planned 
duration of 3 months (FT) 
training, skill formation, language course, job preparation, 
job orientation, completion of school leaving qualifications 
394 
Other programmes  Residual group of several small and very heterogeneous 
programmes  
471 
Total stock sample  10,675 
 
Starting with this sample, we make three further adjustments. Firstly, since we measure 
conditioning variables and outcomes relative to programme start, which is only available for 
participants, we simulate hypothetical start dates for all nonparticipants. We (i) regress the 
time between sampling and programme start on individual characteristics
15 in the pool of 
participants and (ii) use the coefficient estimates along with randomly drawn residuals to 
predict the nonparticipants' start dates.
16 We drop all nonparticipants whose simulated start 
date is not between November 2006 and March 2007. Secondly, we ensure that only 
individuals that are in welfare at the sampling date and just prior to the programme start 
remain in the sample. Thirdly, all individuals not available to the labour market due to 
pregnancy, retirement, eased welfare receipt and (contemporaneous) long-term health 
problems and severe disability are deleted from the final evaluation sample that includes 
5,210 nonparticipants and roughly 350 to 610 participants in the tree treatment categories we 
analyse, see Table 3.   
                                                           
15    Stratification characteristics, gender, education, marital status, variables reflecting the employment state 
history and benefit receipt, and regional variables are used as predictors. 
16  This procedure has been suggested by Lechner (1999). The implemented version is analogous to Wunsch and 
Lechner (2008). 
Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  13 Table 3: Gross stock sample and evaluation sample 
  NP OE ST FT 
Stock  sample  8,091  656 479 394 
Simulated programme start for nonparticipants is not within November 
2006 and March 2007   1,466  -  -  - 
Nonparticipants not receiving welfare or in (old) programme at the 
simulated start date  1,164  -  -  - 
Not receiving welfare at sampling date (October 2006)  40  32  44  32 
Not receiving welfare just prior to programme start  4  6  18  11 
Reduced job search requirements: Pregnant, retired, 'eased' welfare 
receipt, long term health problems and severely disabled  207  7  2  4 
Final evaluation sample  5,210  611  415  347 
 
4. Descriptive  statistics 
Table 4 displays the composition of participants in 1-Euro-jobs, short training and further 
training, respectively, and of nonparticipants with respect to individual characteristics, 
regional attributes, and employment histories. This allows investigating the selectivity of 
various subgroups into a specific treatment. Women constitute 59 percent of the 
nonparticipants but account for less than half of the participants in any programme. Lone 
parents and individuals living with children younger than three are over-represented in the 
group of nonparticipants, too. It is also worth noting that the average age is considerably 
higher among nonparticipants and individuals in 1-Euro-jobs compared to other participants. 
Not surprisingly, the share of individuals aged 15 to 24 is higher in short and further trainings, 
whereas the converse is true for those aged 50 to 64 (not in table). Participants in 1-Euro-jobs 
are somewhat less frequently married and face more often health problems.  
The share of individuals without school-leaving qualifications is relatively constant across 
groups, whereas the fraction of persons without vocational degree is somewhat lower among 
nonparticipants. German citizens are over-represented among nonparticipants and 1-Euro-
jobs, individuals with a migration background (non-German nationality, foreign born or 
family language not German) are under-represented in these categories. 1-Euro-jobs are more 
extensively used in East Germany, whereas short and further trainings are less important. By 
Huber, Lechner, Wunsch and Walter, 2009  14 looking at the employment histories, one can see that on average, individuals in 1-Euro-jobs 
have spent fewer months in regular employment than other groups and more time in 
programmes and received welfare for more months (since 2005). However, a smaller share of 
them has never been employed since 1998. The fraction of unemployed since 1998 is lower in 
short and further trainings than in other groups.  









Observations 5,210  611  415  347 
Woman  59 46 47 49 
Lone  parent  22 15 15 15 
Child below age 3 in household  24  11  15  17 
Age  in  years  39 40 34 34 
Married  38 31 35 35 
Health  limitations  15 17 13 13 
No  school  degree  17 16 16 17 
Lower secondary school degree  41  50  49  45 
Upper secondary school degree  25  25  22  23 
Polytechnical college or university entrance degree  9  8  8  9 
No  vocational  degree  41 45 45 48 
Completed  apprenticeship  training  44 50 45 38 
Polytechnical college or university degree  4  3  2  5 
German  citizenship  85 90 80 78 
Migration  background*  30 23 34 33 
East  Germany  19 23 16 18 
Months between sampling date and programme  start  2,9 2,8 3,5 3,1 
Months of welfare receipt since  2005  16.7 17.8 16.0 16.2 
Months of minor employment since  2005  2,7 1,5 2,3 1,7 
Months of regular employment  since  2005  1,8 1,1 1,4 1,8 
Months of unemployment since  2005  14,3 13,5 12,8 13,1 
Months of programme participation  since  2005  1,7 4,8 3,1 2,8 
No employment since 1998  35  30  35  36 
No programme participation since 1998  46  19  37  35 
Fraction of time unemployed since 1998  31  31  26  27 
Note:  Entries are means and, if not stated otherwise, in percent. All variables are calculated from administrative records 
and are measured at the time when the sample was defined (October 2006). * Partly from survey data. 
Thus, nonparticipants, participants in 1-Euro-jobs, and individuals in trainings differ 
considerably in observed characteristics. There are, however, only minor differences between 
the treated in short and further trainings. Participants in 1-Euro-jobs seem to have the worst 
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repeated programme participation, and fewer periods of regular employment. 
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Note:  Horizontal axis: months relative to programme start (month 0). 
Figure 1 displays the proportion of welfare recipients across programmes and nonparticipation 
at different points in time relative to the (simulated) programme start. Month 0 indicates the 
programme start, -1 and 1 represent one month before and one month after start, respectively. 
The pre-start fractions give insights into programme selectivity. Post-start fractions are first 
indications of potential programme effects. They are however not yet corrected for any 
selectivity into the programmes. Nine months before programme start, the share of welfare 
recipients is higher than 85% in all categories and highest among participants in 1-Euro-jobs. 
Nonparticipants show the second highest fraction, followed by further and short training. In 
general, differences are not large, which points to only limited selectivity with respect to pre-
programme welfare receipt. As expected, all individuals receive welfare at the start of the 
programme, as this is a precondition for being selected into the sample. After programme 
start, the fraction of welfare recipients declines least among participants in 1-Euro-jobs and 9 
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and just below 80% for further training. Participants in short training improve their position 
relative to other groups with a fraction of welfare recipients of 75%. Note the lines of the 
different states show the same order before and after the programme which is indicative of 
some potential selection bias related to this variable. This issue will be taken up in the next 
section. 
5. Econometrics 
5.1  Programme effects of interest and identification 
We are interested in identifying the average effects of participation in one of the three 
programmes versus nonparticipation for the respective population of participants. Let   
denote the 'treatment', i.e. participation in some programme. Then, 
D
0 D =  denotes the case of 
nonparticipation and   denotes the case when an individual participated in one of 
the three programmes. Let  denote potential labour market outcomes, e.g. the 
employment states that would have been realised for each treatment. For an early discussion 
of the potential outcome framework, see Rubin (1974). In reality, for each individual only the 
state related to the actually received treatment is observed. The observed outcome is thus  













We want to learn about the mean effect  
0 |, { 1 , 2 , ⎡⎤ =−= ∈ ⎣⎦
dd EY Y D d d θ
 
 
d θ denotes the expected effect for an individual randomly drawn from the population of 
participants in treatment  , i.e. the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET).   d
ATETs are generally not identified so that additional assumptions are needed for 
identification. A restriction often encountered in the programme evaluation literature is the 
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selection into treatment and outcomes are observed in the data and, therefore, they should be 
controlled for. Under this condition, the potential outcomes are independent of the treatment 
conditional on the observed covariates. As this assumption is not testable, it needs to be 
plausibly justified. Such arguments become more convincing when the analysis is based on 
data that are rich in information with respect to the required covariates. The following 
expression formalizes the CIA on the relevant subspaceχ  of the covariate space: 
03 ,..., | , = ∀∈   YY D X x x χ  
 
where  denotes conditional independence and    X  is the vector of observed covariates (see 
Imbens, 2000, and Lechner, 2001, for the exact conditions and identification results in this 
multiple treatment framework). We obtain expressions for the mean potential outcomes 
conditional on covariates that are functions of the participation status, observable outcomes, 
and covariates only: 
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Effect identification of the effects of the programmes compared to nonparticipation (ATET) 
also requires that there is common support in  X  among the respective treated and non-treated 
population:  
( ) Pr( | , {0, }) 1, , {1, 2,3},
d px DdX x D d x d χ ≡== ∈ < ∀ ∈ ∈  
 
where ( )
d p x  denotes the so-called propensity score. Then, the ATET of participation in 
treatment D d =  versus nonparticipation is identified as  
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where  | (| ) XD d f xD d = = denotes the conditional density of X  given the respective treatment 
. Instead of directly conditioning on  Dd = X , Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for binary 
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identification is equivalently obtained by conditioning on a so-called balancing score, such as 
the one-dimensional propensity score  ( )
d p x   (this is useful to circumvent the curse of 
dimensionality related to a nonparametric regression of Y  on a high-dimensional  X ).  
5.2  Plausibility of conditional independence assumption in this setting 
We now discuss the plausibility of the CIA in our research framework given our data. The 
selection process lies formally in the hands of the caseworkers who assign welfare recipients 
to activation programmes that are in principle compulsory, even though there is a limited 
possibility for bargaining between the caseworker and the welfare recipient. Jacobi and Kluve 
(2007) point out that recent welfare reforms have further increased the caseworkers' power 
over the selection process in order to improve the targeting of activation measures.  
Post-reform programme allocation is related to a profiling process based on an interview in 
which the caseworker screens the welfare recipient's skills, deficiencies and labour market 
perspectives. The welfare recipient is subsequently classified according to her employment 
chances. This classification also influences the types of programmes she might potentially be 
assigned to. As noted by Jacobi and Kluve (2007), short training is targeted very broadly at 
those with reasonable employment prospects. Further training should be provided to those 
who benefit most from the newly provided skills and is mainly targeted at individuals with 
good labour market prospects. 1-Euro-jobs are targeted at those welfare recipients with 
otherwise very limited employment chances. They are frequently used in regions with 
particularly bad labour market conditions. 
Given the wealth of individual and household information outlined in Section 3.1 our data are 
very well suited to capture the factors that determine individual employment prospects. In 
particular, we not only observe the standard characteristics like age, gender, marital status, 
household composition, nationality, migration, education and profession, but also health and 
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employment, unemployment, benefit receipt, and programme participation of each individual 
from January 1998 to December 2007. What is lacking in our data are direct measures of 
individual motivation, attitudes and aptitude. It is, however, likely that these characteristics 
are relatively persistent over time such that they have impacted on the labour market success 
prior to the programme start. For this reason it is crucial that we are able to condition on 
individual employment histories in a detailed way. This is also emphasized by Card and 
Sullivan (1988) and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998). 
Furthermore, even though the profiling process is standardised, the organisational structure of 
the agencies might play a role in the judgment of which programme is considered to be most 
appropriate. We control for such differences by using agency level information about the form 
of case management, the number and qualification of caseworkers, and the number of welfare 
recipients per caseworker, among other factors.  
Moreover, local labour market conditions are also crucial for employment prospects. Our data 
contain a large variety of measures of local labour market conditions including - among many 
others - unemployment, vacancies, GDP per worker, industry structure, migration, remoteness 
and distance from the next big city. Thus, we are confident that we capture all major factors 
that affect both selection into the programmes and our labour market outcomes of interest (see 
Section 6.1 for details on the latter). 
5.3  Estimation of the programme effects 
Having established identification of the effects, the question of the appropriate estimator 
arises. All possible parametric, semi- and nonparametric estimators are (implicitly or explic-
itly) built on the principle that for every comparison of two programmes and for every 
participant in one of those programmes we need a comparison observation from the other 
programme with the same characteristics regarding all factors that jointly influence selection 
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17 Here, we use propensity score matching estimators to produce such 
comparisons.
  18 An advantage of these estimators is that they are semi-parametric and that 
they allow arbitrary individual effect heterogeneity (see Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 
1999; Imbens, 2004, provides an excellent survey of the recent advances in this field).  
                                                          
We use a matching procedure that incorporates the improvements suggested by Lechner, Mi-
quel, and Wunsch (2006). These improvements aim at two issues: (i) To allow for higher pre-
cision when many 'good' comparison observations are available, they incorporate the idea of 
caliper or radius matching (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) into the standard (nearest-
neighbour) algorithm. (ii) Furthermore, matching quality is increased by exploiting the fact 
that appropriate weighted regressions that use the sampling weights from matching have the 
so-called double robustness property. This property implies that the estimator remains 
consistent if either the matching step is based on a correctly specified selection model, or the 
regression model is correctly specified (e.g. Rubin, 1979, Joffe, Ten, Have, Feldman, and 
Kimmel, 2004). Moreover, this procedure should reduce small sample bias as well as 
asymptotic bias of matching estimators (see Abadie and Imbens, 2006) and thus increase 
robustness of the estimator. The actual matching protocol is shown in Table B.1 in the 
appendix and contains more technical information about the estimator.  
 
17   Of course, parametric models may construct such a group artificially outside the support of the data. 
18   We estimate  ()
d p x  by probit specifications. Among individual characteristics, gender, age, marital status, 
children younger than 3, nationality, and education appeared to be good predictors for selection into 
treatment. Individuals aged 50 to 64 are less likely to participate in any programme, and children under 3 
decrease the probability of being assigned to further training. Furthermore, variables related to the 
employment history have considerable explanatory power. They include last occupation,  duration of the last 
minor or regular employment, time  in employment since 2005, time in programmes since 1998, average 
programme duration and number of programmes since 2005, time spent out of labour force since 1998, 
number of months in welfare receipt between sampling date and start date. Also regional variables 
characterize the treatment assignment. E.g. a large proportion of long term unemployed increases the 
likelihood to be assigned to 1-Euro-jobs. The exact specifications and results are available upon request. 
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are interested in ATETs and since participation is not random, we cannot simply use the 
sample weights  j η  that account for stratification with respect to the total population of 
interest. Rather, we have to compute the probability of being part of a particular 
subpopulation conditional on treatment status. Using Bayes' law this can be done for each 
individual j using 
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When calculating the mean potential outcomes in each state d, the factor π j   has to be 
multiplied with the weight of the individual obtained by matching (1 for treated). Note that 
because stratification and attrition are independent of the participation status it suffices for the 
consistency of the first-step estimation of the propensity scores  ( )
d p x  to include all 
characteristics used to compute the sample weights  j η as explanatory variables, see Manski 
and Lerman (1977). 
We use the fixed-weight standard error estimator proposed by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch 
(2006). It is the same as the one suggested by Lechner (2001) and applied in Gerfin and 
Lechner (2002) and Lechner (2002) except that heteroscedasticity is allowed for. See Lechner 
and Wunsch (2008) for the motivation and all details of this variance estimator that shows 
some resemblance to the estimator suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2006).   
5.4  Simulating alternative allocations of welfare recipients to programmes 
To answer the question whether programmes are targeted efficiently, we investigate the 
optimality of the allocation process. In contrast to the identification of ATETs, which is based 
on mean potential outcomes, the determination of the optimal allocation of welfare recipients 
into various programmes requires the knowledge of the potential outcomes for each individual 
in the sample. We therefore would have to know all potential outcomes  for all 
03 ,..., YY
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approach to predict the unobserved counterfactuals is similar to the one in Lechner and Smith 
(2007). Four aspects have to be taken into account. First, selection has to be controlled for, 
again by conditioning on the propensity score. Second, the potential outcomes have to be 
predicted as accurately as possible, including characteristics observed by the caseworkers 
suspected to influence their decision to allocate the welfare recipients. We therefore include 
vocational degree, regional characteristics, and variables reflecting the employment history as 
predictors. Third, due to the high dimensionality of the characteristics to be accounted for, 
nonparametric estimation of the potential outcomes is infeasible. Therefore, we use probit 
specifications for the potential outcome predictions, as the outcome variables are binary (see 
Section 6.1). Fourth, all characteristics used to compute the sample weights  j η  have to be 
included in the probit specifications, too, for the estimation to be consistent for the stratified 
sample. To obtain representative average potential outcomes, the individual potential 
outcomes are multiplied with the respective sample weight.  
Estimation of the coefficients required to predict 
d Y  is based on the s ample having the  ubs
respective treatment status D d = . In each group, the binary outcome is estimated as a 
function of the propensity scores for all relevant comparisons, the variables used in the 
computation of weights, and characteristics observed by the caseworkers who decide upon 
programme allocation. The coefficient estimates are then used to predict the potential 
outcome 
d Y for all individuals in the sample and this is done for all  {0,..,3} ∈ D . Based on the 
predicted  otential outcomes, the results for different allocati regarding the 
assignment of welfare recipients into the programmes are simulated. However, it has to be 
remarked that the probit coefficients are estimated rather imprecisely due to small sample 
sizes in 1-Euro-jobs, short training and further training. This is not accounted for in the 
optimal allocation, which is determined by comparing the potential outcomes for each 
p on  es rul  
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potential outcomes are statistically significant. In the interpretation of the results we therefore 
have to bear in mind that the potential outcomes are estimated with higher uncertainty for 
programme participants than for nonparticipants.  
6 Results 
6.1  Outcomes of interest and their measurement 
 the programmes are able to reduce 
s in two ways. On the one hand, we use the administrative records to 
From a policy perspective, the main interest is whether
welfare dependency of their participants and whether they help them to find some form of 
employment. Moreover, since we focus on the first programme after the sampling date, it is 
interesting for the interpretation of the results to what extent individuals participate again after 
the first programme. 
We measure outcome
construct half-monthly outcome measurements starting with the first period after programme 
start. Focusing on the beginning rather than the end of the programme accounts for 
endogeneity of actual programme durations and rules out that programmes appear to be 
successful just because people are busy in the programme. We observe outcomes for all 
individuals in the sample up to 9 months after programme start. This period is relatively short 
but this is the price to pay when looking at very recent programmes. However, the half-
monthly measurements allow looking at the short-run dynamics of the effects, thus potentially 
providing first indications of trends of the evolution of the effects in later periods. Moreover, 
they allow picking up potential lock-in effects of the programmes (cf. van Ours, 2004; 
Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch, 2006, 2007; Wunsch and Lechner, 2008). One drawback of 
using administrative records is that information on employment is missing after 2006. 
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reported employment status at the time of the second interview. Here, we are able to observe 
all outcomes of interest, but there are drawbacks as well. On the one hand, when individuals 
report to be in a programme we do not know whether this is the programme we evaluate or 
some other programme. Therefore, we do not report the survey results for this outcome 
measure. On the other hand, for each individual the second interview took place at different 
distances to programme start. Thus, when measuring outcomes we pick up a mixture of short 
(in particular of potential lock-in effects) and longer-run effects. 
6.2  The effects of the programmes 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the effects of the programmes on welfare receipt (upper 
panel) and future programme participation (lower panel) for the comparison with 
nonparticipation for the first 9 months after programme start based on administrative records. 
It turns out that within this period none of the programmes significantly reduces welfare 
dependency. Only for short training the effect stabilizes at a reduction of about 5 %-points but 
the effect is still not significant. Programme participation seems to induce considerable future 
participation compared with nonparticipation (see lower panel of Figure 2).
19 
It is important to note, though, that sample sizes are too small to detect small effects of the 
programmes (standard errors vary between 0.06-0.07 for welfare receipt and between 0.03-
0.04 for future programme participation). Thus, concluding from the results that the 
programmes are ineffective would not be appropriate. 
                                                           
19  Unfortunately, we cannot investigate whether there are positive long-run effects of participation in a sequence 
of programmes. Besides looking at a very short outcome window, our sample is too small to account for 
dynamic treatment effects as suggested by e.g. by Lechner (2009). However, it is not very likely that there are 
positive effects in the long-run because the estimated (insignificant) effects of programmes on welfare receipt 
are quite stable in the last three month of our observation period and do not indicate any future change. 





























One‐Euro‐Jobs sig. Short training sig. Further training sig.  
Note:  Horizontal axis: months after programme start. Sig.: effect is significant on the 5% level (point-wise). Outcomes are 
calculated from administrative records. Standard errors vary between 0.06-0.07 for welfare receipt and between 
0.03-0.04 for future programme participation. 
The above results are confirmed with respect to welfare receipt when looking at the self-
reported employment status at the time of the second interview in Table 5. With respect to 
employment, we find positive and significant average effects for participants in short training 
and it seems that the gain is in terms of 'self-sufficient' employment (individuals are employed 
and not welfare dependent). For the other programmes, there are some indications of positive 
employment effects as well but they are not significant.  
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Table 5: Effects of the programmes compared to nonparticipation in %-points/100 
  One-Euro Job  Short training  Further training 
Observations 611  415  347 
Welfare receipt  0.030 (0.07) -0.046 (0.06)    -0.034 (0.07)  
Insured employment   0.056 (0.04) 0.091 (0.04) **  0.035 (0.04)  
Minor employment  -0.037 (0.04) -0.014 (0.03)    -0.005 (0.04)  
Employed or self-employed  0.023 (0.05)  0.063 (0.05)    -0.012 (0.05) 
Employed or self-employed, no welfare receipt  0.007 (0.03) 0.080 (0.03) **  0.041 (0.04) 
 Note:  Standard errors in brackets. ***/**/* Effect is significant at the 1/5/10% level. Outcomes are calculated from self-
reported employment status from the second wave of the survey. 
6.3 Effect  heterogeneity 
In this section, we investigate whether there are some groups of participants that particularly 
benefit from the programmes. For example, we are interested in whether the programmes help 
those groups of welfare recipients that face particularly severe problems in reducing welfare 
dependency by returning to the first labour market. For this purpose, we estimate the 
programme effects in strata defined by gender, age, presence of small children in the 
household, lone-parent status, region, and migration background. The results are displayed in 
Table 6. Note however, that again the sample sizes are too small to draw definite conclusions 
from insignificant effects. 
In contrast to the average effects, we find positive and weakly significant employment effects 
for participants in 1-Euro-jobs who are men, who are not lone parents and who do not have a 
migration background. However, these employments do not seem to be self-sufficient, i.e. pay 
enough to eliminate welfare benefit receipt. Moreover, the differences to the respective 
groups with opposite characteristics are small so that it cannot be concluded from the results 
that one group really benefits more than the other. 
 
 
 Table 6: Effects of the programmes compared to nonparticipation in %-points/100 for various subgroups 






50-64  Child below age 3
No child  
below age 3 
One-Euro Job versus nonparticipation 
Welfare receipt  0,040 (0.09)    0,010 (0.11)   0,056 (0.10)   0,098 (0.10)    -0,011 (0.18)   0,120 (0.16)   0,024 (0.07)  
Insured employment   0,088 (0.05) *  0,064 (0.06)   -0,052 (0.07)   0,039 (0.07)    0,061 (0.06)   0,029 (0.12)   0,039 (0.04)  
Minor employment  -0,027 (0.04)    -0,040 (0.06)   0,005 (0.04)   0,010 (0.06)    -0,003 (0.08)   -0,017 (0.08)   -0,031 (0.04)  
Employed or self-employed  0,026 (0.07)    0,068 (0.08)  0,010 (0.08)  0,018 (0.09)   0,004 (0.11)  -0,055 (0.15)  0,030 (0.06) 
Employed or self-employed 
without welfare receipt  0,014 (0.05)    0,029 (0.05)  -0,002 (0.07)  -0,077 (0.06)   0,046 (0.05)  -0,077 (0.06)  0,011 (0.04) 
Observations 328  283 150 265  196 66 545
Short training versus nonparticipation 
Welfare receipt  -0,050 (0.08)    -0,035 (0.10)   -0,117 (0.10)    0,026 (0.09)    -0,187 (0.18)   -0,098 (0.16)   -0,008 (0.06)  
Insured employment   0,089 (0.06)    0,106 (0.06)   -0,018 (0.06)   0,072 (0.07)    0,083 (0.06)   0,102 (0.11)   0,048 (0.05)  
Minor employment  -0,020 (0.04)    -0,025 (0.05)   -0,020 (0.05)   -0,054 (0.05)    0,041 (0.10)   0,160 (0.08)**  -0,006 (0.03)  
Employed or self-employed  0,075 (0.07)    0,038 (0.08)  -0,022 (0.08)   0,001 (0.08)   0,111 (0.12)   0,217 (0.12)*  0,038 (0.05) 
Employed or self-employed 
without welfare receipt  0,096 (0.05) *  0,062 (0.05)  0,135 (0.05)***  0,018 (0.06)   0,158 (0.07)**  0,175 (0.09)**  0,040 (0.04) 
Observations 219  196 158 186  196 62 353
Further training versus nonparticipation 
Welfare receipt  -0.032 (0.09)    -0,023 (0.11)   -0.133 (0.11)   -0.008 (0.09)    0.062 (0.16)   -0.048 (0.18)   0.001 (0.07)  
Insured employment   0.056 (0.06)    0,020 (0.07)   0.143 (0.06)**  0.010 (0.07)    0.009 (0.08)   0.156 (0.16)  0.001 (0.05)  
Minor employment  0.023 (0.04)    -0,054 (0.06)   -0.002 (0.05)   0.031 (0.05)    0.000 (0.08)   0.072 (0.11)   -0.020 (0.04)  
Employed or self-employed  0.016 (0.07)   -0.071 (0.09)  0.150 (0.07)**  -0.054 (0.08)   0.055 (0.12)   0.144 (0.18)  -0.057 (0.06) 
Employed or self-employed 
without welfare receipt  0.059 (0.05)   0.022 (0.05)  0.158 (0.06)***  -0.025 (0.05)   -0.015 (0.08)  0.099 (0.15)  0.015 (0.04) 
Observations 328  283 150 265  196 66 545
 Note:  Standard errors in brackets. ***/**/* Effect is significant at the 1/5/10% level. Outcomes are calculated from self-reported employment status from the second wave 
of the survey. 
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Table 6: Effects of the programmes compared to nonparticipation in %-points/100 for various subgroups (continued) 





One-Euro Job versus nonparticipation 
Welfare receipt  0,032 (0.15)    0,030 (0.07)   -0,038 (0.17)   0,038 (0.08)   -0,079   0,008 (0.08)  
Insured employment   0,009 (0.07)    0,074 (0.04)*  0,118 (0.08)   0,057 (0.05)   0,117   0,071 (0.04)* 
Minor employment  0,126 (0.09)    -0,032 (0.03)   -0,002 (0.06)   -0,042 (0.04)   -0,082   0,003 (0.03)  
Employed or self-employed  0,146 (0.12)   0,040 (0.06)  0,139 (0.12)  0,029 (0.06)  0,001 (0.11)  0,072 (0.06) 
Employed or self-employed 
without welfare receipt  0,001 (0.06)   0,012 (0.04)  0,038 (0.08)  0,005 (0.04)  0,071 (0.07)  0,015 (0.04) 
Observations 92  519 138 472 140 471
Short training versus nonparticipation 
Welfare receipt  -0,008 (0.16)    -0,064 (0.07)   -0,012 (0.16)   -0,044 (0.07)   0,022   -0,113 (0.08)  
Insured employment   0,084 (0.13)    0,117 (0.04)***  0,185 (0.11)   0,067 (0.05)   0,030   0,113 (0.05)** 
Minor employment  -0,109 (0.07)    -0,010 (0.03)   -0,116 (0.05)**  0,005 (0.04)   0,051   -0,081 (0.04)** 
Employed or self-employed  0,008 (0.16)   0,101 (0.05)*  0,102 (0.13)  0,055 (0.06)   0,040 (0.09)  0,079 (0.06)  
Employed or self-employed 
without welfare receipt  0,061 (0.10)   0,100 (0.03)***  0,038 (0.08)  0,074 (0.04)**  0,060 (0.06)  0,121 (0.04)*** 
Observations 64  351 67 348 142 273
Further training versus nonparticipation 
Welfare receipt  -0.101 (0.19)    -0.035 (0.07)   -0.019 (0.20)   -0.013 (0.07)   0.029   -0.024 (0.09)  
Insured employment   0.043 (0.12)    0.060 (0.05)   0.150 (0.13)   0.005 (0.05)   -0.023   0.072 (0.05) 
Minor employment  -0.014 (0.09)   -0.024 (0.04)   0.108 (0.11)  -0.011 (0.04)   0.049   0.004 (0.04)  
Employed or self-employed  -0.097 (0.15)   0.008 (0.06)  0.174 (0.15)  -0.035 (0.06)  -0,008 (0.10)  0.023 (0.06)  
Employed or self-employed 
without welfare receipt  0.036 (0.09)   0.052 (0.04)  0.002 (0.08)  0.033 (0.04)  -0,015 (0.08)  0.075 (0.04)* 
Observations 92  519 138 472 140 471
 Note:  Standard errors in brackets. ***/**/* Effect is significant at the 1/5/10% level. Outcomes are calculated from self-reported employment status from the second wave 
of the survey. 30 
 
The positive average effects of short training on self-sufficient employment seem to stem 
predominantly from participants who are either young or elderly, who have small children, or 
who have no migration background. For the latter as well as for East Germans it also seems 
that minor employments have been reduced in favour of regular insured employment. In 
contrast, the employment effect for participants with small children seems to stem from a 
substantial increase in minor employments.  
For further training we now find evidence for positive employment effects for young 
participants and individuals without a migration background. 
6.4  Optimal allocation of welfare recipients to programmes 
Given that the programmes exhibit some effect heterogeneity with respect to participant 
characteristics it is interesting to investigate whether caseworkers send those welfare 
recipients to the programmes who benefit most from them. Focusing on the two most 
important outcome variables, i.e. welfare dependency and self-sufficient employment or self-
employment, we compare the average outcomes of different allocations of welfare recipients 
to programmes using predictions of the respective variable as a function of characteristics for 
each individual in our evaluation sample. Table 7 presents the mean outcomes of the actual 
allocation and three alternatives for cost-neutral reallocations that keep the share of 
participants in each programme type constant. 
The first interesting result is that the caseworker allocation and a random allocation yield very 
similar results for both outcomes of interest. However, caseworkers still do considerably 
better than in the worst-case scenarios, which would yield a 5 percentage points higher rate of 
welfare dependency or an about 4 percentage points lower employment rate. The overall 
scope for improvement by switching to the optimal allocation is for both outcomes about 9 
percentage points which indicates a substantial inefficiency of the allocation process. Table 7: Mean outcomes for different allocations 




Actual allocation  78.65  14.37 
Random assignment  77.98  15.13 
Outcome maximization  83.79  23.28 
Outcome minimization  69.50 10.06 
Difference between optimal and actual policy  -9.15  8.91 
Note:  Entries are in percent. Shaded cells indicate the optimal policy. 
7 Conclusions 
We use a unique data set that combines rich survey, administrative and regional data to 
provide early evidence on the effects of the three most important welfare-to-work 
programmes used in Germany since the last major welfare reform in 2005. This so-called 
Hartz IV reform constitutes the starting point for labour market activation of welfare 
recipients in Germany. Precisely, we look at short and further training as well as a workfare 
programme called 1-Euro-jobs that were conducted between October 2006 and March 2007, 
and consider short-run outcomes up to 12 months after programme start.  
On average, we do not find significant effects of the three types of programmes on future 
welfare receipt. But all programmes induce further programme participation. Only short 
training, which is a combination of job-search assistance, work-tests and minor adjustment of 
skills, has on average a significant positive effect on self-sufficient employment. Moreover, 
all programmes exhibit considerable effect heterogeneity meaning that there are several 
subgroups of participants that do benefit from the programmes. We find positive and weakly 
significant employment effects for participants in 1-Euro-jobs who are men, who are not lone 
parents and who do not have a migration background. Short and further training is effective 
for young participants and non-migrants. In addition, short training also shows positive 
employment effects on the elderly and people with small children. 
Given this effect heterogeneity we investigate whether caseworkers send those welfare 
recipients to the programmes who benefit most from them. We find that the observed 
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programmes that keeps the share of participants in each programme type and hence, 
programme costs constant would reduce welfare dependency by about 9 percentage points 
and would increase employment by a similar amount.  
The results of this paper shed light on the short-term effects of the three quantitatively most 
important activation measures used since the Hartz IV legislation. However, sample sizes are 
currently too small to draw definite conclusions about the short-run effectiveness of the 
programmes. Further research is also required to evaluate long-term effects of a broader range 
of programmes and activation measures. This will eventually allow judging on the overall 
effectiveness of an important component of the recent welfare reforms in Germany. 
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age  38.66 39.87 33.48 34.24 
woman  0.59 0.46 0.47 0.49 
German  0.85 0.90 0.80 0.78 
migration background  0.30 0.23 0.34 0.33 
child below age 3 in household  0.24  0.11  0.15  0.17 
married  0.38 0.31 0.35 0.35 
single  0.33 0.47 0.41 0.45 
cohabiting  0.08 0.07 0.07 0.05 
lone  parent  0.22 0.15 0.15 0.15 
no school-leaving qualifications  0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 
secondary schooling (Hauptschule)  0.41 0.50 0.49 0.45 
secondary  schooling  (Realschule)  0.25 0.25 0.22 0.23 
high school graduate  0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 
no professional degree  0.42 0.45 0.45 0.48 
vocational  education  0.40 0.45 0.42 0.34 
technical  school  0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 
college  or  university  0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 
health limitations  0.15 0.17 0.13 0.13 
health limitations impact on job placement  0.10 0.12 0.09 0.08 
returning to the labour market  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03 
  Region 
Berlin  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 
Eastern  Germany  0.19 0.23 0.16 0.18 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania  0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Brandenburg  0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 
Saxony-Anhalt  0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 
Saxony  0.05 0.06 0.04 0.02 
Thuringia  0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Schleswig-Holstein  and  Hamburg  0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Lower  Saxony  and  Bremen  0.12 0.13 0.15 0.21 
North Rhine-Westphalia  0.20 0.15 0.18 0.12 
Hesse  0.07 0.02 0.06 0.05 
Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland  0.08 0.14 0.07 0.09 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10 
Bavaria  0.16 0.15 0.21 0.18 
  Desired occupation 
agriculture, forestry, horticulture, mining  0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 
production and processing  0.03 0.04 0.05 0.02 
technical occupation, engineering  0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 
construction  0.05 0.09 0.07 0.07 
unskilled  worker  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
services  0.25 0.26 0.25 0.24 
office management and administration  0.10 0.12 0.10 0.13 
artist  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
health sector  0.03  0.02 0.02 0.01 
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other occupations  0.17 0.14 0.13 0.13 
  Role in household 
head  of  household  0.76 0.82 0.74 0.76 
partner 0.16  0.13 0.13 0.15 
underage, unmarried child  0.05 0.01 0.07 0.04 
unmarried person of full age and under  25  0.03 0.04 0.07 0.05 
  Additional sources of household income 
earned  income  0.14 0.15 0.19 0.14 
earned income and other sources of income 0.28 0.24 0.30 0.29 
no  income  0.33 0.38 0.30 0.34 
other sources of income  0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22 
  Welfare payments in EUR 
baseline benefits  246.42 282.48 272.31 260.63 
housing  costs  160.29 164.23 153.72 159.08 
further costs for special needs  23.51 14.19 14.05 16.85 
  Source of income before welfare receipt 
unemployment benefits  0.25 0.29 0.29 0.25 
unemployment assistance  0.21 0.27 0.18 0.16 
social  assistance  0.23 0.21 0.22 0.21 
earned  income  0.19 0.13 0.20 0.23 
mini-job (minor employment)  0.11 0.06 0.09 0.10 
self-employment  0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 
support for professional training and education  0.03  0.04 0.03 0.04 
lived  on  savings  0.16 0.14 0.20 0.16 
lived  on  partner's  income  0.14 0.09 0.14 0.13 
lived  with  parents  0.15 0.14 0.24 0.18 
other sources of income  0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 
  Reason for applying for welfare 
finished education/ professional training  0.04 0.07 0.07 0.06 
gave up self-employment  0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 
unemployment benefit entitlements expired  0.23 0.28 0.28 0.24 
became unemployed without entitlement to 
unemployment benefits  0.10 0.10 0.14 0.15 
unemployment benefits were insufficient to make 
a  living  0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 
became incapable of working, disabled  0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
familial and/or housing situation changed  0.14 0.10 0.12 0.12 
other household members became unemployed  0.07 0.04 0.08 0.06 
income of other household members decreased  0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07 
parents applied for welfare  0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 
other reasons  0.05  0.04 0.04 0.06 
savings  were  eaten  up  0.10 0.09 0.11 0.12 
moved out and founded an own household  0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 
  Employment history since 1998 
months employed   14.42 14.99 13.71 12.84 
months unemployed   28.22 29.09 22.63 22.30 
months in programme   5.40 9.94 6.90 6.48 
months out of labour force    40.11 36.63 38.84 40.00 
months since last employment  23.93 28.56 22.75 19.07 
months since last unemployment  1.77 2.31 1.87 1.38 
months since last programme  12.95  7.52 7.87 9.10 
months since last out of labour force  spell  23.76 28.78 22.00 22.58 
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number of unemployment spells    1.87 2.41 1.87 2.01 
number of programmes   1.05  1.74  1.30  1.33 
num. of out of labour force spells    2.32 2.61 2.30 2.49 
mean employment duration   8.45 8.36 8.88 7.61 
mean unemployment duration   17.27 14.33 13.19 12.52 
mean programme duration   2.90 4.91 3.50 3.42 
mean out of labour force duration    22.96 19.21 22.13 22.54 
share of employment   0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 
share of unemployment   0.31 0.31 0.26 0.27 
share in programme   0.06  0.11  0.08  0.07 
share out of labour force   0.44 0.40 0.46 0.48 
duration of last employment  7.26 7.32 7.36 6.49 
duration of last unemployment  15.48 11.46 10.66 10.20 
duration of last programme  2.81 3.95 2.74 3.00 
duration of last out of labour force  spell  18.34 15.56 15.95 13.55 
  Characteristics of last employment 
last monthly earnings in  EUR  613.78 683.66 591.90 629.18 
employee,  clerk  0.11 0.09 0.08 0.10 
skilled worker, master craftsman, foreman  0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07 
worker  0.17 0.23 0.22 0.22 
apprentice 0.06  0.06 0.10 0.07 
part  time  employment  0.23 0.23 0.19 0.16 
employed in production and processing industry  0.28 0.30 0.28 0.29 
employed in service industry  0.28  0.29  0.29  0.28 
employed in other industries  0.05 0.08 0.07 0.05 
occupation: agri-/ horticulture, forestry,  mining  0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 
occupation:  unskilled  worker  0.05 0.07 0.04 0.07 
occupation: technical occupation, engineering  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
occupation: office management, admin., teaching 0.18  0.15  0.16  0.17 
occupation:  logistics  0.07 0.07 0.10 0.08 
occupation:  services  0.16 0.13 0.16 0.10 
occupation:  construction  0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 
occupation  :  metal  working  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
occupation : other production and processing  0.07 0.10 0.08 0.08 
Note:  All variables are measured at the sampling date. If not stated otherwise, entries are fractions. In addition to the 
variables in the table, a rich set of regional variables as well as variables that further disaggregate the 
information contained in the employment histories have been used in the estimation. 
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Table B.1: A matching protocol for the estimation of a counterfactual outcome and the effects 
Step 1  Specify a reference distribution defined by X.  
Step 2  Pool the observations forming the reference distribution and the participants in the respective period. Code an 
indicator variable W, which is 1 if the observation belongs to the reference distribution. All indices, 0 or 1, used 
below relate to the actual or potential values of W. 
Step 3  Specify and estimate a binary probit for  () : ( 1 | ) px PW X x = ==  
Step 4  Restrict sample to common support: Delete all observations with probabilities larger than the smallest maximum 
and smaller than the largest minimum of all subsamples defined by W.  
Step 4  Estimate the respective (counterfactual) expectations of the outcome variables. 
Standard propensity score matching step (multiple treatments) 
a-1) Choose one observation in the subsample defined by W=1 and delete it from that pool. 
b-1) Find an observation in the subsample defined by W=0 that is as close as possible to the one chosen in step 
a-1) in terms of  () , p xx   . 'Closeness' is based on the Mahalanobis distance. Do not remove that 
observation, so that it can be used again.  
c-1) Repeat a-1) and b-1) until no observation with W=1 is left. 
Exploit thick support of X to increase efficiency (radius matching step) 
d-1) Compute the maximum distance (d) obtained for any comparison between a member of the reference distri-
bution and matched comparison observations. 
a-2) Repeat a-1). 
b-2) Repeat b-1). If possible, find other observations in the subsample of W=0 that are at least as close as R * d 
to the one chosen in step a-2) (to gain efficiency). Do not remove these observations, so that they can 
be used again. Compute weights for all chosen comparisons observations that are proportional to their 
distance. Normalise the weights such that they add to one. 
c-2) Repeat a-2) and b-2) until no participant in W=1 is left. 
d-2) For any potential comparison observation, add the weights obtained in a-2) and b-2). 
Exploit double robustness properties to adjust small mismatches by regression 
e) Using the weights   obtained in d-2), run a weighted linear regression of the outcome variable on the 
variables used to define the distance (and an intercept).  
() i wx
f-1) Predict the potential outcome   of every observation using the coefficients of this regression:  .   0() i yx
0 ˆ () i yx
f-2) Estimate the bias of the matching estimator for 









Ww y x Wy x
NN =
= =
− ∑ . 
g) Using the weights obtained by weighted matching in d-2), compute a weighted mean of the outcome variables 
in W=0. Subtract the bias from this estimate to get   0 (| 1 EY W ) = . 
Step 5  Repeat Steps 2 to 4 with the nonparticipants playing the role of participants before. This gives the desired esti-
mate of the counterfactual nonparticipation outcome. 
Step 6  The difference of the potential outcomes is the desired estimate of the effect with respect to the reference 
distribution specified in Step 1. 
Note:  x    includes gender, elapsed unemployment duration until programme start, and whether a person is employed in 
month 12 or month 24 before programme start. In some specifications, we also match on education. In the 
specification where programme composition is held constant, we also match on the type of programme and 
planned programme duration.x    is included to ensure a high match quality with respect to these critical variables.  
The parameter used to define the radius for the distance-weighted radius matching (R) is set to 
90%. This value refers to the distance of the worst match in a one-to-one matching and is 
defined in terms of the propensity score. Different values for R are checked in the sensitivity 
analysis in Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2006). The results were robust as long as R did not 
become 'too large'. 
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